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ENFORCEMENT OF THE MERGER LAWS BY PRIVATE
PARTY LITIGATION
EARL W. KiNTNERt AND MERLE F. WILBEIDINGtt
The rising tide of economic concentration has become an increasing
cause of concern during the past two decades.m ' The full impact of this
wave of merger activity has not yet been ascertained. It is clear, however,
that there has been a significant decrease in the number of firms, while
a significant increase in the size of existing companies has taken place.
This economic phenomenon has not gone unnoticed in either the public
or private sectors. The Government has maintained an increasingly
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws relating to mergers,' an
enforcement program which has been amplified by what sometimes seems
to be the universal rule that the Government always wins.
In addition to both civil and criminal governmental actions, Congress
has enacted legislation which permits, indeed encourages, private litigants
to enforce the antitrust laws. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides, in
part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States in the district
in which the defendant resides, or is found, or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.4
The prospect of a treble damage recovery provides sufficient incentive for
a private plaintiff to institute an action to enforce the antitrust laws.5
t Partner: Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C. Member:
Indiana and District of Columbia Bars. Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (1959-
61) ; General Counsel (1953-59).
tt Julge Advocate General's Corp, United States Army, Washington, D.C. Member:
Iowa and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Cf. FTC, EcoNoMiC REPoRT oN CoRpoRATE MERGERS 29 (1969).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) ; United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586 (1957).
3. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) ; Window on Washington, 5 MERGERS & AcQuisimnoS 56, 57 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
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Thus, private treble damage actions have significantly aided the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. The great majority of these actions have been
premised upon violations of § § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and §§ 2
and 3 of the Clayton Act.' Although sometimes overshadowed by the
statutes upon which other private actions are premised, § 7 of the Clayton
Act, the merger law, is also an "antitrust law,"' as specifically provided
in § 1 of the Clayton Act.9 Section 7 can, therefore, be enforced by a
private litigant. In exercising his right to enforce § 7, the private litigant
can seek either an equitable remedy (injunction or divestiture) or a
legal remedy (money damages). The former remedy is governed by §
16, while the latter is governed by § 4.
EQUITABLE REMEDIES
A most effective enforcement tool for the private litigant is speci-
fically authorized by § 16 of the Clayton Act. This provision states, in
relevant part:
[A] ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled
to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . as against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including
sections two, three, seven and eight of this Act, when and under
the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceed-
ings. .... 10
The effectiveness of this provision was upheld in American Crystal
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 13, 14 (1970). Cf. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Pri-
vate Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959) ; Loevinger, Private Action-
The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Loevinger] ; Maclntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7
ANTITRUST BULL. 113 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Maclntyre] ; Stein, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act as a Basis for the Treble-Damage Action: Whei May the Private Litigant
Bring His Suit7, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 968 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stein].
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1967)
New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346 (3d
Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72 (R. Hawaii
1964). Contra, Highland Supply Corp v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 728 n.3
(8th Cir. 1964) ; Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Hawaii 1964), affd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1968) ; Gottes-
man v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 414 F.2d 956
(2d Cir. 1969).
9. "Antitrust laws," as used herein, includes . . . this Act.
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 27 (1970).
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Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.11 The defendant had acquired
a substantial block of stock in the plaintiff corporation. The parties were
competitors in the same product market, refined sugar, and in the same
geographic market, a ten-state area spreading over the Mississippi River
valley. The plaintiff was granted an injunction which prohibited the
defendant from voting its American Crystal stock, from acquiring repre-
sentation on the American Crystal board of directors and from acquiring
additional stock of the plaintiff corporation. 2 Before granting the in-
junction, the court first had to determine that the evidence established a
violation of § 7. Even though the plaintiff had not established any
elimination of competition, proof that the defendant's program was
designed to bring a "closer association" between the two corporations
was held sufficient to demonstrate that the acquisition of stock by the
defendant tended to lessen competition."3 This conclusion was necessary
to implement fully the Clayton Act's intent to "arrest restraints of trade
in their incipiency." 4 There was no requirement that the plaintiff prove
that competition was actually lessened." It was only necessary to
demonstrate that the acquisition could have lessened competition, and that
the plaintiff was threatened with loss or damage thereby.
The importance of American Crystal Sugar Co. lies in its affirmance
of the private party's right to enforce the merger law, § 7 of the Clayton
Act, through an action for an injunction. This result is in accord with the
congressional intent that this private right of action provide a necessary
and vigilant enforcement of the Clayton Act.' While probably not as
economically enticing to the private litigant as a treble damage action,1 7
the equitable right under § 16 of the Clayton Act does provide a remedy.
An injunction can prevent the incipient evil from maturing into an actual
restraint. In order to invoke the § 16 equitable remedy, the plaintiff
need only show a threatened loss or damage by a merger or acquisition.
In American Crystal Sugar Co., the threatened loss was the expense the
plaintiff could expect if the Justice Department instituted enforcement
proceedings against it."8 Therefore, it appears that § 16, as a tool in the
11. 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
12. Id. at 400. The plaintiff also sought divestiture of the already-held stock, but
the court declined, believing that the injunction was sufficient relief to protect the plain-
tiff's interests. Id. at 400-01.
13. Id. at 395.
14. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
15. Id.
16. Maclntyre, supra note 6, at 113-15.
17. See generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
(1965) [hereinafter cited as TiMBERLAKE] ; Loevinger, supra note 6.
18. 152 F. Supp. at 393.
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field of private enforcement of the antitrust laws, is particularly effective
in the area of mergers. If private parties had to establish actual injury to
their property before an injunction could be granted, the effectiveness of
the cause of action would be significantly decreased, if not nullified. But
the courts have consistently followed the express language of § 16. Only
a violation and threatened harm need be demonstrated; actual injury is
not necessary. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in 1969:
That remedy [injunction] is characteristically available even
though the plaintiff has not yet suffered actual injury .
[H]e need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from
an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a con-
temporary violation likely to continue or recur.1"
Although § 16 speaks only of injunctions, with no specific delinea-
tion of other equitable relief,2" it seems reasonable to conclude that it
also envisions divestiture of stock as an appropriate remedy.' In
American Crystal Sugar Co., the court noted, without disapproval, that
divestiture was requested in addition to the permanent injunction.22
The court's reason for not granting divestiture was that the injunction
was a sufficient remedy "so that divestitute is not necessary."23 Although
divestiture is certainly a harsh remedy," its use may be necessary in
19. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969).
However, in Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth
Circuit held that cancellation of plaintiffs' (wholesale beer distributors) distributorship
agreement did not violate § 7:
Where, as here, a supplier seeks no more than a better equipped and more ag-
gressive distributor for his product, his conduct may in fact be more beneficial
than detrimental to competition, and is not condemned by either the Sherman or
Clayton Acts. As the antitrust laws do not prohibit a business from fairly
entering into a competitive market, neither do they prohibit its improvement
of its competitive stature in the product market. . . . Termination of a dis-
tributorship does not become a violation of Section 7 simply because the manu-
facturer or supplier taking such action has recently been involved in a merger
or acquisition of stock or assets with another company.
Id. at 1215.
20. Cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 602 (1951).
21. Cf. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957);
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 400-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Van Cise, Limitations Upon Dives-
titure, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 147, 151-53 (1950); Wise, Three D's of Antitrust En-
forcement, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1958 INSTITUTE
ON ANTITRUST LAWS 114-25 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Wise]; Comment, Aspects of
Divestiture as an Antitrust Remedy, 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 135 (1963) ; Note, Availability
of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 49 MINN. L. REv. 267 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Availability].
22. 152 F. Supp. at 398.
23. Id. at 401.
24. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 602 (1951)
(concurring opinion) ; Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
296
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certain instances to give any meaningful effect to an injunction. For
instance, an injunction prohibiting a defendant from acquiring additional
stock of a company would be of no value if, in fact, the defendant already
possessed sufficient stock to control the company's business plans and
policies. The practical effect of such an injunction would be meaningless.
Moreover, the idea of divestiture as a proper tool to remedy a § 7
violation is inherent in the nature of the evil proscribed by that statute.
If the acquisition of a particular stock is the violation of § 7, the dive-
stiture of that same stock should necessarily be the appropriate remedy.25
In spite of the logic of this position, the judicial formulation of the
rule has been a matter of confusion and difficulty. For example, in
American Commercial Barge Line v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates,"
a federal district court, with no discussion or citation of authority, con-
cluded that an "action cannot properly be brought by a private litigant
under § 16 of the Clayton Act for divestiture of assets allegedly acquired
in violation of the antitrust laws."2 This unsupported conclusion has
not been followed elsewhere. Other courts, although not granting dive-
stiture, have suggested that it would be a proper remedy in an appropriate
case. For example, in Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 8 a federal
district court judge concluded that divestiture was within the meaning
of § 16 of the Clayton Act. In Burkhead v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,29 the
court, although acknowledging that the issue was not fully settled, stated
that it concurred with the Bostitch reasoning:
We are inclined to agree with this conclusion that divestiture
may be an appropriate form of relief under Clayton Act Section
16 and that we should not rule out the possibility of such
relief at this point. While the divestiture would appear to be
appropriate only in a limited number of cases where no other
form of preventative would suffice, one such case where divesti-
ture might be the only adequate and complete remedy would
be where, as here, plaintiff alleges a monopoly and restraint of
trade which is injuring the plaintiff."0
Although courts have indicated that divestiture is a proper remedy under
§ 16, they are very reluctant to so order. For example, in Schrader v.
25. Availability, supra note 21, at 268-70.
26. 204 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
27. Id. at 453.
28. 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
29. 308 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
30. Id. at 127.
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National Screen Service Corp.,"' the court pointed out that policy con-
siderations militate against granting divestiture when such action would
effect the complete destruction of a nationwide business. 2 Other decisions
have impliedly indicated that divestiture is an appropriate remedy,3 have
expressly stated so in dicta34 or have held outright that divestiture is
appropriate.-"
Although opponents of divestiture may argue that the remedy is too
severe and that it may destroy a corporation's business, their argument is
significantly weakened, if not negated, by the inherent attributes of such
an equitable remedy. Foremost of these factors is the judge's discretion
in deciding whether or not to grant divestiture. The existence of a § 7
violation does not, ipso facto, require divestiture; the Supreme Court
rejected this argument in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co.8" Instead the decision whether or not to grant divestiture lies in the
sound discretion of the judge.17 Moreover, even if divestiture is granted
it is subject to appellate review to determine whether such discretion was
abused.
The defendant in a private antitrust suit also has an important
interest to protect in considering whether divestiture should be ordered.
If it appears that divestiture would be an appropriate remedy, the defen-
dant can take steps to minimize its impact. For example, defendant
might be able to negotiate a settlement which would accomplish the same
objective without immediate abandonment of the stock. Thus, an in-
junction might be entered prohibiting the defendant from voting the
stock,88 converting the stock to non-voting stock"9 or transferring the
stock to a trustee.4" Partial divestiture and gradual divestiture are other
alternatives which might be utilized in a particular case."'
The scope and use of divestiture as a means of enforcing § 7 has
not yet fully matured. Additional judicial development is required to
construct guidelines for its applicability as an appropriate remedy. Dive-
stiture is an equitable remedy which can be an extremely effective anti-
31. 95 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
32. Id. at 70.
33. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
34. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
35. National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
36. 366 U.S. 316, 328 n.9 & text accompanying (1961).
37. Availability, supra note 21, at 282-83.
38. Wise, supra note 21, at 122-23.
39. Id. at 123.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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trust enforcement weapon. The primary limiting factor is that divestiture
makes no recompense to the plaintiff for either his damages or his
litigation expenses."2
LEGAL REMEDIES
The counterpart to the equitable remedies of injunction and divesti-
ture is the legal remedy of money damages. In the area of antitrust law,
this is particularly attractive to the private litigant48 since § 4 of the
Clayton Act authorizes treble damages. Section 4 mandates:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States in the district
in which the defendant resides, or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.4"
Great publicity has been given treble damage actions based upon such
notorious Sherman Act violations as price fixing45 and market division."
It is also well settled that treble damage recoveries can be predicated upon
violations of §§ 2 (price discrimination) 4 ' and 3 (tie-in arrange-
ments)4" of the Clayton Act. An interesting question, however, is
whether a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act also supports a § 4 treble
damage action.' Logically an affirmative conclusion is required. Section
4 authorizes recovery of treble damages for "anything forbidden in the
42. See Loevinger, supra note 6, at 174.
43. Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Sudt, 4 ANTITRUST BU.LL.
29 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Handling].
44. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See generally TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 14-15;
Guilfoil, Damage Determination in Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NOTR DAmE LAv., 647
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Guilfoil] ; Loevinger, supra note 6, MacIntyre, supra note 6.
45. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas.
79,435 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See generally, Guilfoil, supra note 44, at 655-57.
46. Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
47. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1958); Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), affd, 187 F.2d 919
(5th Cir. 1951). See generally E. ItNTNFR, A ROBINSON-PATMANr PRIM-R 297-309
(1970).
48. Alles Corp. v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Englander
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959). See generally E. KINTNER,
AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 47-58 (1964).
49. Note, Treble Damage Actions for Violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38
U. CHrL L. R v. 404 (1971).
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antitrust laws."5" Section 1 of the Clayton Act" makes clear that § 7 is
one of the "antitrust laws." Reading those two provisions together, as
it appears they must be read, it seems unmistakably clear that a violation
of § 7 of the Clayton Act would support a treble damage recovery. 2
Despite the logical ease in reaching this conclusion, the litigation
involving this question has been long and strewn with obstacles." In
1957, immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in the du Pont
case,54 minority stockholders of General Motors brought a treble damage
derivative suit in Gottesman v. General Motors Corp." In Gottesman,
the plaintiffs alleged that du Pont violated not only § 7 of the Clayton
Act, but also breached its common law fiduciary duty by selling its pro-
ducts to G.M. at excessive prices. Despite the fact that this was the first
case which litigated the propriety of a treble damage award for a viola-
tion of § 7 of the Clayton Act, the district court gave short shrift to the
issue:
The test . . . is whether "there is a reasonable probability that
the acquisition is likely to result in the condemned restraints."
Plaintiffs cannot be damaged by a potential restraint of trade or
monopolization. There can be no claim for money damages for
a violation of section 7.5"
Since this was a pretrial ruling, appellate review was not automatic and,
in this instance, did not occur for over five years." The pretrial ruling
in Gottesman, however, was followed in two subsequent decisions. In
Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co.,5" a district court also
refused to proceed on a complaint asking for money damages due to
violation of § 7. The district court stated:
Since Clayton § 7 is concerned with the future monopolistic
50. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
52. Stein, supra note 6, at 971.
53. One writer remarked that he "has not found a single reported case litigated
under § 4, alleging a section 7 violation, which has resulted in an award of damages."
Stein, supra note 6, at 971.
54. There, the Court held that du Pont's ownership of 23 per cent of the stock of
General Motors constituted a violation of § 7 because of du Pont's commanding position
as a supplier of automotive finishes and fabrics to G.M.
55. 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
56. 221 F. Supp. at 493 (emphasis in original).
57. The Second Circuit denied leave to appeal the district judge's ruling in an un-
reported decision, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964). The ruling was, however, eventu-
ally reversed. 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
58. 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964), affd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1086 (1968).
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and restraining tendencies of corporate acquisition, i.e., proba-
ble (and hence not certain) future restraints on coninerce, any
damages claimed for prospective restraint of trade would be
purely speculative. 9
In Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co." the District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri, confronted with the Gottesman
and the Bailey's Bakery decisions and with an indication by the Eighth
Circuit in a related proceeding6 that there was no private right of action,
begrudgingly concluded that the cause of action for money damages
based on § 7 had to be dismissed. 2
The apparent trend toward complete denial of any consideration of
treble damage actions for § 7 violations was partially diverted in Julius
M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc.68 Factually distinguishing the three earlier
cases, the court in Bostitch concluded that the nature of the injury in
that case permitted a monetary recovery. 4 The plaintiff in Bostitch,
pursuant to a pre-existing agreement, was a distributor of metal fasteners
procured from Calnail, which was the exclusive agent for Calwire, the
manufacturer. The defendant, Bostitch, was the principal competitor in
the metal fastener product maket. In 1961 Bostitch entered into an
agreement by which Cawire would be merged into Calnail and Bostitch
would then acquire all the stock of Calnail."5 Another integral part of
the acquisition agreement called for all "pre-existing arrangements" for
the distribution of Calwire products to be eliminated. Thus, the effect of
the acquisition was to destroy the plaintiff's distributorship agreement
with Calnail. It was this important fact which distinguished the earlier
59. 235 F. Supp. at 717.
60. 245 F. Supp. 510 (ED. Mo. 1965).
61. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 728 n.3 (8th Cir.
1964).
62. [Section 16 of the Clayton Act] would appear to be an explicit answer to
our proximate cause issue: if a person can suffer threatened loss by reason of
a violation of [§ 18], then surely he can be "injured in his business or property
by reason of' that which is prohibited by § 7. This logic can be answered only
by arguing that the enumeration of specific sections in § 16 Clayton distin-
guishes it from § 4 Clayton and that § 4 should be strictly construed in view
of the drastic and unusual nature of the treble damage remedy.
It is clear to this court that the Eighth Circuit was well aware of the exact
dimensions of this issue of causation when it stated that a private right of action
could not accrue from a violation of § 7 Clayton. It has chosen to apply too
narrow a concept of causation and this Court must defer thereto.
245 F. Supp. at 513-14 (emphasis in original).
63. 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
64. Id. at 525-26.
65. Id. at 522.
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cases from Bostitch. In the earlier cases, at the moment of acquisition,
there was only a probability that the plaintiffs would be harmed. In
Bostitch, at the moment of the acquisition, the plaintiff could point to a
specific injury-the loss of his distributorship agreement. Moreover, the
plaintiff's loss of the distributorship agreement was caused by an acquisi-
tion which had been conceded, for the purposes of that proceeding, to be
violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act.66 There was no escape from the
logical conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek money damages,
and the court accordingly held that the complaint stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted.67 Two years later the Fifth Circuit, in
Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.,6" held that a treble damage action
could be predicated upon a § 7 violation. 9 In spite of the number of
courts which had rejected the argument that money damages could be
based upon an illegal acquisition," the courts in Bostitch and Quality
School Plan concluded that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff was entitled
to bring a treble damage action for violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
The hodgepodge produced by the conflicting decisions left most of the
legal world in confusion, if not in outright disbelief. The result was
encouragement of forum shopping by plaintiffs attempting to find a
district or circuit which was amenable to their position. The confusion,
ambiguity and judicial inconsistencies spawned a genuine need to clarify
and resolve this split in the law."'
This need was satisfied in 1969 when the Second Circuit considered
the original Gottesman pretrial ruling" six years after the district judge
had ruled that § 7 of the Clayton Act did not permit a cause of action
for money damages."8 After extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings,
66. Id. at 524.
67. Id.
68. 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
69. Cf. Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also, Note, Private Party Denied Cause of Action for Treble
Damages for Violation of Section 7 of Clayton Act, 64 COLTIJ. L. REv. 597 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Private Party] ; Note, Private Actions Under Sections 4 and 7 of the
Clayton Act: A Fresh Look at an Old Problem, 29 Onio ST. L.J. 756 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Private Actions].
70. See, e.g., Isidor Weinstein Inv. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 303 F. Supp. 646 (N.D.
Cal. 1969); Dairy Foods Inc. v. Farmers Co-op Creamery, 298 F. Supp. 774 (D. Minn.
1969); Utah Gas Pipelines Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 233 F. Supp. 955 (D.
Utah 1964). See also TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, § 17.18, at 244-45. In Bowl America,
Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969), the court discussed the issue
at some length but made no decision.
71. Cf. Stein, supra note 6, at 995.
72. 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
73. 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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the parties had come to trial in 1966, limited to the causes of action arising
from du Pont's sale of automotive finishes and fabrics to General Motors
for use in its passenger cars. Even on these issues, the trial was limited
solely to the questions concerning the liability of du Pont and the injury
to General Motors. The issue of the amount of damages, if any, was not
to be litigated at this stage. After hearing all the evidence, the district
court judge dismissed those causes of action and found that du Pont had
neither used its stock to control General Motors' purchases nor abused
any fiduciary duty owed to G.M. Since these causes of action were
separate claims and because there was no just reason for delay, the
findings of the district court were ripe for appellate review. 4
The Second Circuit gave little consideration to the issues resolved
at the trial. 5 Instead the court reviewed and reversed the district court's
1963 pretrial ruling that § 7 of the Clayton Act could not support a
private cause of action for money damages.7 ' After reviewing the cases
which had denied the cause of action,7 those which had upheld it"8 and
the commentary which had supported recognition of the cause of action,"
the Second Circuit concluded that it was in agreement with those authori-
ties who had concluded that § 7 did furnish a basis for money damages
in a private action."0 Even though § 7 speaks of reasonable probabilities
of restraint of trade or monopolization, the court ruled that compensable
injury has been demonstrated if actual restraint occurs as a proximate
result of the illegal merger or acquisition. The court further stated that
even though § 7 connotes violations based on threatened harm, it does
not preclude money damage recoveries if actual harm can be proven:
But if the threat ripens into reality we do not see why there
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
75. 414 F.2d at 958-59.
76. Id.
77. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo.
1965); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii
1964), affd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1968).
78. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Julius M.
Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cf. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965); Blaski v. Inland
Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1959) ; Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1964). These latter
cases impliedly sanctioned a private cause of action for money damages by either dis-
missing or affirming dismissal of a § 7 money damage claim, not because § 7 would not
support the claim, but because the plaintiffs failed to make a sufficient showing of spe-
cific, proximate injury. 414 F.2d at 960.
79. J. ScoTr & E. ROcKEFELLER, ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION TODAY: 1967, at
340-42 (1967) ; Stein, supra note 6, at 971-80 (1968) ; Comment, 79 HAmv. L. Rtv. 445
(1965) ; Private Actions, supra note 69.
80. 414 F2d at 960-61.
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can never be a private cause of action for damages. If section
7 is designed to prevent acquisitions that "may" or "tend to"
cause specified harm such an acquisition may either itself
directly bring about the harm, or make possible acts that do.
We do not say that a section 7 violation nust, or even probably
will, have that result; but that it may and that plaintiffs should
have a chance to prove injury "by reason of" the violation are
persuasive propositions."'
The Second Circuit decision in Gottesman was quickly followed by
the District Court for the District of Hawaii in Kirihara v. Bendix
Corp.82 Reversing the position it had taken in Bailey's Bakery,8" the
district court concluded that it had thrown "too wide a loop" when it
stated in Bailey's Bakery that no private right of action accrued from a
violation of § 7.84 Admitting that at the time of the Bailey's Bakery
decision it was but "a novitiate in the antitrust sect of the judicial priest-
hood,"85 the court concluded that a treble damage action could be premised
on a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act and that a contrary holding
would negate the clear inference that Congress intended § 4 of the Clayton
Act to apply to all the antitrust laws, including § 7.88 The authoritative
statement from the Second Circuit in Gottesman, coupled with Kirihara,
seems clearly to indicate that a private cause of action for money damages
can be predicated upon a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act.87
VIOLATION, FACT AND AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
Courts have often been confused by the distinction between the
right of the litigant to sue and the burden of proof needed to win. The
plaintiff must establish both that a certain amount of damages have been
incurred and that an injury was caused directly or proximately by the
illegal acquisition or merger. This confusion was, perhaps, a major cause
of the sort of litigation represented by Gottesman. Once the plaintiff has
been accorded his right to bring a treble damage action based on an
alleged violation of § 7, he still has some very important hurdles to
81. Id. at 961.
82. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
83. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
84. 306 F. Supp. at 88.
85. Id. at 81.
86. Id. at 88.
87. The Gottesman and Kirilhara decisions were followed in Isidor Weinstein Inv.
Co. v. Hearst Corp., 310 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (pretrial opinion) ; Western
Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Conn. 1969) ; Metro-
politan Liquor Co., Inc. v. Heublein, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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overcome before he can succeed in his quest for treble damages. The
Gottesman and Kirihara decisions, and their progeny, only recognize the
plaintiff's cause of action. The plaintiff still must sustain his burden of
proof to recover." Implicit in the above statement is the requirement
that the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (a)
a violation of § 7; (b) the fact of damage to his person or property
(which includes injury and causation);89 and (c) a reasonably certain
amount of damages flowing from that injury.9"
VIOLATION
First and foremost for the plaintiff to prove is the defendant's
violation of one of the antitrust laws, in this instance § 7 of the Clayton
Act. Unlike the Sherman Act, which proscribes actual restraints,9 § 7
makes violative potential restraints based upon probabilities. This, of
course, is an advantage to the plaintiff in establishing a violation of the
antitrust laws since this standard is more lenient than that provided in
the Sherman Act. Moreover, if recent cases brought by the Government92
are indicative of the judicial penchant for upholding a violation of § 7,
the private plaintiff can be reasonably optimistic about his ability to satisfy
this requirement.
In addition, private parties are able to use a -prior judgment in a
Government suit as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.9
88. As the Second Circuit stated in Gottesman:
[P]laintiffs cannot rest on a showing of a violation of § 7; they must, as in
private actions under other sections of the antitrust laws, prove that they have
been injured by the violation.
414 F.2d at 961. Proof of the amount of damages is also necessary. Cf. Guilfoil, supra
note 44. See also, Private Party, supra note 69, at 601; Comment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 445,
446-47 (1965).
89. A few courts have held that the "fact of damage" must be proved to a certainty.
See, e.g., Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) ; Momand v. Universal Film Exch., Inc.,
172 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
90. See TimBE R AK, supra note 17, at 14-15:
Each of these elements must be proved by competent evidence. Merely because
the case involves antitrust and that a Congressional purpose fosters such suits,
does not mean that the general rules of justice may be cast aside in such a case.
While the statutory burden of the plaintiff may not lawfully be increased, neither
can that burden be lawfully diminished below the standard imposed by the
statute by disregarding other normally established rules and principles.
Id. at 14.
91. Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
is declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
93. One commentator has suggested that:
The evidentiary effect of the judgment in a government suit should be conclu-
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This is specifically permitted under § 5 (a) of the Clayton Act.94 The
only limitation upon the use of a prior judgment is that § 5(a) does
not apply to consent judgments or, according to judicial interpretation,
to nolo contendere pleas.95 If a private plaintiff is able to use a prior
Government judgment as prima facie evidence of a violation, his cause
is invaluably enhanced. However, even if the Government action resulted
in a consent judgment and is, therefore, inadmissible, the Government's
earlier case might disclose other sources from which additional admissible
evidence might be gained by further investigation and discovery."
Another valuable factor aiding the plaintiff's cause is that the four-year
statute of limitations for the commencement of private actions is tolled
while the Government suit is pending.
One question which has not been resolved in this area is whether a
violation for one period of time can be proven by use of a Government
judgment which established a violation for a different period of time.9
This issue arose in the Gottesman litigation. The judgment in the
Government suit was made as of June, 1949, the time at which the
Government suit was brought.9" The plaintiffs, minority stockholders of
General Motors, were seeking damages for injury incurred by G.M.
after May 4, 1950."9 Since the two cases covered different time periods,
the trial judge ruled that the Government judgment could not be used
as evidence against the defendants.' The Second Circuit disagreed."' 1
sive in subsequent litigation, rather than merely prima facie, as is now the case
in private actions.
Loevinger, supra note 6, at 174.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). See generally Shores, Treble Damage Antitrust
Suits: Admissibility of Prior Judgments Under Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 54 IowA
L. REv. 434 (1968) ; Timberlake, The Use of Government Judgments or Decrees in Sub-
sequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1961).
95. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), affd on
other grounds, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 664 (1941). See also Note,
Nolo Pleas in Antitrust Cases, 79 HAv. L. REV. 1475 (1966) ; Note, Section 5 of the
Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea, 75 YALE L.J. 845 (1966) ; Note, The Admis-
sibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 76 YALE L.J. 684
(1967).
96. Cf. Handling, supra note 43, at 43-44.
97. The situation arises most commonly in conspiracy cases. In those cases courts
tend to permit the use of a Government judgment-even though it covers an earlier time
period-because of the rule that criminal conspiracies are deemed to continue until aban-
donment or success. See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) ; United
States v. Kissell, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910) ; Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691 (9th
Cir. 1937).
98. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
99. "This was apparently the earliest date at which any plaintiff owned General
Motors stock." 414 F.2d at 958 n.2.
100. 221 F. Supp. at 494.
101. 414 F.2d at 962.
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Acknowledging that some decisions took a strict view and did not permit
the admission of a Government judgment unless that judgment pertained
to all or a part of the same period alleged in the private action," 2 the court
rejected this rigid rule in favor of a more flexible one. This liberal rule
would allow determination of the issue after an evaluation of the relevancy
and materiality of the judgment to the pending litigation.' In the du
Pont litigation, although the judgment found that a violation existed as
of June, 1949, no relief was decreed until 1961.104 Thus, it was reasonable
to conclude that since there was a probability of the lessening of com-
petition in 1949, that probability continued throughout the 1950's. There-
fore, the Government judgment, being relevant and material, was entitled
to substantial evidentiary weight in the trial court's determination of
whether there was a violation of § 7 after May 4, 1950.105 If this decision
is followed by other circuits and district courts, the result will be a
somewhat less restrictive use of Government judgments and, therefore,
an additional factor which will encourage private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. This flexible standard appears to be more reasonable since
the admissibility of a particular judgment is determined by relevance and
materiality. This should go far in avoiding needless injustices to private
plaintiffs. 1 6
The proof of a § 7 violation is, therefore, a sine qua non to a
successful prosecution of a private treble damage suit. The "probability"
standard of the Clayton Act, compared to the actual restraint standard
of the Sherman Act, should substantially alleviate the plaintiff's burden.
102. International Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach., 315 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963) ; Orbo Theatre Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 770
(D.D.C. 1957), aff d per curiam, 261 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
943 (1959). Cf. Webster Rosewood Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatre, Inc., 263 F.2d 533
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
103. 414 F.2d at 963.
104. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961) (com-
plete divestiture ordered).
105. On remand, du Pont "conceded that its stock interest in General Motors con-
stituted a violation of § 7 during the damage period." 310 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 436 F.2d 1205 (1971). Although the second Circuit had stated that the judg-
ment was entitled to "substantial evidentiary weight," the district court, on remand, did
not discuss whether this was equal to a "prima facie" case. On subsequent appeal, with-
out discussion, the Second Circuit, referring to its earlier opinion, stated that it had
held that "the plaintiffs were entitled to have [the government judgment] treated as
prima facie evidence in their case." Id. at 1208.
106. Quaere: Should a prior Government judgment be accorded prima facie weight
anytime it is admitted? In cases like Gottesmna where the time periods of the two suits
do not overlap would it not be more reasonable to weigh the Government judgment as
"same evidence" or "substantial evidence," but not necessarily as "prima facie evidence?"
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Indeed, it should make proof of a violation the easiest of the three hurdles
to overcome in seeking a money damages recovery.
FACT OF DAMAGE
The second hurdle in a private treble damage action based upon a
violation of § 7 is that the plaintiff must show that he was in fact
damaged by the illegal acquisition. This point distinguishes the private
action from the Government action in which the Government need only
establish a violation in order to obtain relief."' This injury-in-fact require-
ment is perhaps the most difficult aspect of a treble damage action. In
addition, the private litigant's burden of proof under § 7 is probably
more difficult than his burden in an action based on price fixing or price
discrimination. In the latter type of situation, the plaintiff succeeds if he
can establish that his competitors paid price X and that he was forced
to pay price X+- °."' In an action based on § 7, the plaintiff has t¢
establish that the illegal acquisition directly injured his business. The
difficulty is increased since numerous variables and economic factors must
be evaluated, regardless of their materiality. The quantum and quality
of these variables and economic factors sometimes makes the determin-
ation of legal injury appear to be little more than informed speculation."' 9
Failure to establish injury was the cause of the plaintiff's eventual
defeat in the Gottesman litigation."0 In initially permitting the plaintiff
to bring the treble damage action, the Second Circuit stated that the
plaintiffs, in addition to proving a violation, must "prove that they have
been injured by the violation.""' Since it was a stockholders' derivative
suit, the plaintiffs were required to prove injury to General Motors.
Although they had alleged that du Pont had used its ownership of G.M.
stock to cause G.M. to purchase its automobile finishes and fabrics from
them, the plaintiffs, on the trial, failed to prove that G.M. could have
purchased the materials from someone other than du Pont at lower
prices with equal service and quality." 2 In addition, the small percentage
of G.M.'s fabric requirements which were allocated to du Pont significant-
107. Johnston, Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act from the Perspective
of Defence Counsel, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 87 (1962) ; Timberlake, The Legal Injury Re-
quiremients and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws,
30 GEo. WASe. L. REv. 231 (1962) ; Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of
a Private Antitrust Action, 21 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 341 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Pollock].
108. Cf. Pollock, supra note 107, at 342-43.
109. Handling, supra note 43, at 31-32.
110. See note 105 supra.
111. 414 F2d at* 961.
112. 310 F. Supp. at 1260.
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ly deflated the plaintiffs' allegations." 3 The trial judge concluded that
G.M.'s decision to purchase du Pont's products was one of "considered
business judgments,""' 4 and was not made because of du Pont's owner-
ship of 23 per cent of G.M.'s stock.
The result in the Gottesman litigation is some indication of the
difficulty a plaintiff encounters in proving that an acquisition directly
caused economic injury to his person or property. In some situations,
however, the injury element might not be at all speculative. For example,
in Bostitch the plaintiff had his distributorship agreement terminated
upon the defendant's acquisition of Calnail. Since a specific provision of
the acquisition agreement provided that all distributorship agreements
were to be cancelled," the plaintiff had no difficulty in establishing a
specific injury directly caused by the acquisition. Suppose, however, that
A Corporation acquires B Corporation, which is a competitor of corpora-
tions C and D. Assuming that in the year following the acquisition the
sales of C and D decline, it is still impossible to conclude that the decrease
in sales was an injury caused by A's acquisition of B (assuming the
acquisition was a violation of § 7). As is readily apparent, the spectrum
of difficulty in proving "injury" and "causation" in a private action is
vast indeed. The lack of absolute standards in this area of antitrust
litigation compounds the difficulty. It is no wonder that proving the
fact of damage is one area in which the private plaintiff must tread most
carefully in order to keep his suit successfully afloat.
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
In addition to proving that the defendant's merger or acquisition
violated § 7 and that the violation directly injured his person or property,
the plaintiff must prove a reasonably certain amount of damages flowing
from that injury. This is one of the most difficult tasks for the private
plaintiff since it frequently requires the consulation and expert testimony
of economists and certified public accountants."' Because in most in-
stances the plaintiff is seeking recovery for lost profits or decreased busi-
113. Id.
114. In making this ruling, the trial judge reaffirmed his findings made at an earlier
trial which had been set aside because of insufficient consideration given to the prior
Government judgment. For the complete text of that opinion, see 279 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
115. The facts of Bostlitch are discussed at text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
116. Handling, supra note 43, at 31-32. Compare Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558 (1951)
(accountant) with Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) (economists).
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ness, his efforts to ascertain and estimate his damages may border on spec-
ulation.1 ' Damages based on speculation have never been permitted since
speculations of witnesses "form no better basis of recovery than the
speculation of the jury themselves." '118 In spite of the difficulties involved
in demonstrating the amount of damages, courts have permitted their
award if the plaintiff has established a factual basis from which damages
can be reasonably determined.119 Although "guessing" is not permitted,
courts do not require mathematical certainty in proving the amount of
dam~ages."20
A guideline for the resolution between the two extremes of mathe-
matical certainty and sheer speculation was provided by the Supreme
Court in the 1946 case of Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc."'
Recognizing the inherent difficulty in proving damages to a precise
certainty in an antitrust case, the Court held that, as between the victim
plaintiff and the wrongdoer defendant, the plaintiff should be awarded
damages if he can provide a factual basis from which the jury can reason-
ably estimate the amount:
[T]he jury may not render a verdict based on speculation
or guesswork. But the jury may make a just and reasonable
estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and render its
verdict accordingly. In such circumstances, "juries are allowed
to act on probable and inferential as well as upon direct and
positive proof. . . ." Any other rule would enable the wrong-
doer to profit by his wrongdoing at the expense of his victim.
It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so effective
and complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by
rendering the measure of damages uncertain. Failure to apply it
would mean that the more grievous the wrong done, the less
likelihood there would be of a recovery ...
The constant tendency of the courts is to find some way in
which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done.
Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of
recovery for a proven invasion of the plaintiff's rights. 22
117. Handling, supra note 43, at 31-32.
118. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901).
119. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 303.
120. Id. at 305.
121. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
122. Id. at 264-66. See also Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S.
544 (1941); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555
(1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927);
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Despite the Bigelow doctrine, the determination of what constitutes
speculation and conjecture as opposed to reasonable estimates based on
furnished facts continues to be a perplexing problem for litigants and
judges.' This determination must of necessity be made on a case-by-case
basis. 24 The Ninth Circuit attempted to state the general rule as follows:
Under all the facts in the case the damages must have a reason-
able and fair relationship to the type, extent and period of the
restraint applied, the number of outlets affected by the restraint
and the kind of product, its price and saleability, the profit
made on sales, and an estimate of the amount of profit lost by
reason of the illegal activities of the defendant. 5
Frequently proof of the amount of damage is intertwined with
proof of the fact of damage. 6 In a treble damage action based on § 7
of the Clayton Act, the problem may be further compounded because of
that statute's proscription of mergers and acquisitions which may sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. The original
appellate decision in Gottesman"' alluded to the difficulty of proving the
fact or amount of damages caused by a potential restraint of trade or
monopolization.'28 Bailey's Bakery recognized the same difficulty; that is,
that § 7 is concerned with anticipated but unimplemented acts of
restraint.' However, the better theory seems to be that put forward by
the Second Circuit in Gottesman :...
The basis of the pretrial ruling [denying the money claim
cause of action] was that a section 7 violation can cause no
damage because it establishes only that harm was threatened,
not that it occurred. But if the threat ripens into reality we do
not see why there can never be a private cause of action for
damages.'8
Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1944). See generally
TIw3BERLAKE, supra note 17, at 304-06; Guilfoil, supra note 44, at 657-61; Handling, supra
note 43, at 31-33.
123. TI MBRrAXE, supra note 17, at 305.
124. Id. at 307.
125. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960). Cf. TIMRBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 307.
126. TIMBMrLARE, sitpra note 17, at 302.
127. 414 F.2d at 956.
128. Id. at 961.
129. Cf. United States v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
130. 414 F.2d at 961.
131. TmErLAxn, supra note 17, at 308 (emphasis added).
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It becomes readily apparent that if the plaintiff has to establish that the
threatened harm (probable restraint or monopolization) has ripened into
reality, he, in effect, has the burden of establishing an actual restraint or
actual monopolization. Thus, the practical effect might be to transform
into an action based on § § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act a suit based on
§ 7 of the Clayton Act.182
Proving the amount of damages directly resulting from an illegal
merger or acquisition is at least as difficult as proving the amount of
damages resulting from other antitrust violations. For example, in a
horizontal merger situation, the plaintiff2 a corporation, may argue that
the merger forced it to lower its prices in an effort to remain competitive
and that, in spite of this action, its sales volume decreased. If the merger
is illegal, the plaintiff would seek damages to recover profits lost because
of the merger. In addition, the plaintiff may argue that its decreased
earnings caused an additional amount of injury in the form of a decreased
return on its capital investment. 8 ' In order to furnish a sufficient factual
basis upon which the amount of damages can be reasonably calculated,
the plaintiff must produce credible witnesses who can construct an
economic analysis model simple enough for the jury to comprehend yet
sophisticated enough to convey the facts and figures necessary to compute
the requested amount of damages.
The method by which the amount of damages is proven can be one
of several alternatives. *Most common is the "before and after" or
"temporal"'" 4 method in which the plaintiff produces facts and figures.3 5
of his economic position both before and after the illegal merger or
acquisition." 6 This theory can be a very effective way of portraying the
amount of damages inuring to the plaintiff. Such an approach has sub-
stantial validity if the effect of the illegal merger or acquisition can be
isolated and other economic variables (for example, general recession,
inflation, strikes) can be extracted before the evidence is presented at
trial.' The courts have accepted this method as one which presents both
132. Id.
133. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 317-31.
134. See Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98-9 (8th Cir. 1901);
cf. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
135. If this method is used, the jury should be instructed that the facts and figures
being used are real, rather than hypothetical, in order to avoid having the jury make their
own economic adjustments on the basis of facts they remember from their personal ex-
periences.
136. Greenwald, The Measurement of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 5 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 293, 300-01 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Greenwald].
137. See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 331-33.
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a sufficient factual basis and one that will withstand any argument that
damages were based on speculation and conjecture. 38
Another method of proving the amount of damages is by the
"cross-sectional"' 89 or "yardstick"'40 theory, by which evidence is present-
ed as to the economic position of the plaintiff and is then compared with
evidence which depicts the economic position of a competitor.n '4 The
corporation used as the yardstick must be a comparable business.Y2 For
a private action predicated on a violation of § 7, it must be in the same
product market and the same geographic market. In addition, extraneous
variables must be removed from the testimony in order that a minimal
amount of variance owing to unrelated and uncontrollable collateral
factors is present. The verdict will, therefore, be an amount reflective
of the damage caused solely by the illegal merger or acquisition. If
constructed correctly, this method can be very effective and sufficiently
factual to permit a reasonable computation of damages.
A third method suggested for providing a factual basis from which
damages may be reasonably estimated is the use of expert witnesses.'48 A
highly qualified economist or management consultant presents his opinion
as to what would have happened had the illegal merger or acquisition not
occurred. His hypothetical analysis will enable the jury to compute the
amount of damages reasonably. Expert testimony alone is not sufficient,
however. The plaintiff must also present facts relating to his business so
that the expert's opinions can be applied to the particular facts involved.
This factual basis must be introduced to avoid or negate arguments that
the verdict was a result of speculation based only on hypothetical situa-
tions. If the plaintiff has factual evidence of injury to his business, the ex-
pert testimony merely fills in the gaps. The defendant cannot complain
since his antitrust violation created the risk of uncertainty."
Although the Bigelow decision relaxed the standard of proof in
favor of the plaintiff, the nature of the problem, proving what would have
happened if the merger had not taken place, always subjects the verdict
138. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Richfield Oil
Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960).
139. TIMBMLAKM, supra note 17, at 331-33.
140. Id. at 333-39.
141. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).
142. Greenwald, supra note 136, at 295.
143. United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1941); Westmoreland Asbestos Co.
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See Handling, supra note
43, at 30.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1954); Dallas
Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 65 (D.N.J. 1958), aff d, 275 F.2d 202 (3d Cir.
1960).
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to the attacks of speculation and conjecture. However, if the plaintiff has
utilized an accepted method of measuring his damages, he will be certain
that he has furnished a factual basis from which the amount of damages
can be reasonably inferred and computed. The quantum of damages will
always depend on the operating and financial data of the plaintiff's
business."' Proper presentation of these facts will insure the private
plaintiff that his verdict has a sufficient factual basis to be upheld on
appeal.
PROPER PLAINTIFFS
In a private action seeking redress for an illegal merger or acquisi-
tion, as in any private antitrust action, the plaintiff n ust have standing.
In general, antitrust law takes a more restrictive view than does tort law
in defining those plaintiffs who have standing to bring actions for
damages. The plaintiff must, of course, have suffered injury.46 An
injury to the public interest is insufficient ;147 it must be an injury to the
plaintiff's business.'48 The difficulty arises in the determination of the
directness of the plaintiff's injury. Compounding, or perhaps causing, the
problem is the fact that any recovery is automatically trebled. Thus, the
potential liability of a defendant would become astronomical if an overly
wide scope of standing were recognized by courts. Judge Wyzanski
alluded to this in an early case:
In effect, businessmen would be subjected to liabilities of inde-
finable scope for conduct already subject to drastic private
remedies. Courts aware of these considerations have been
reluctant to allow those who were not in direct competition with
the defendant to have a private action even though as a matter
of logic their losses were foreseeable.""9
145. See, e.g., Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Burhead v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1930) ; Pollock, The "Injury" and
"Causation" Elements of a Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691, 693-
95 (1963) ; Note, Standing to Sue for Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 570, 574 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Standing].
146. Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
147. Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd,
211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
148. See, e.g., Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957); Peter v.
Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1953). See generally TIMBER-
LAKE, supra note 17; Standing, supra note 145, at 582.
149. Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
See also Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1953) ; Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), af'd, 305 F.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1962) ; Kogan v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956) ; Gomberg
v. Midvale Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 71,070 (E.D. Pa. 1955). See generally Blake, The
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The problem continually arises and demands consideration in every case.
Whether an injury is direct and proximate or whether it is remote and
incidental is a question which by its very nature is susceptible of no
definitive rule.' Although no general rule has yet been formulated, some
rather consistent guidelines* have evolved which delineate categories of
persons who can and cannot institute private antitrust actions.
If a corporation makes an acquisition or merger which results in a
substantial lessening of competition and a tendency towards monopoly, any
corporation that has suffered a direct injury from that illegal merger or
acquisition has standing. The cause of action, however, belongs only to
the corporation. The corporation's right can be exercised by the corpora-
tion itself'. or by shareholders in a derivative suit."2 Although there
was an early holding that stockholders could not bring a derivative action
for treble damages since that remedy was essentially equitable,5 ' that
obstacle presumably has been eliminated with abolition of the distinction
between law and equity."5"
While standing inheres in the corporation, either directly or deriva-
Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 143 (1961) ; Standing,
supra note 145, at 583.
150. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917)
(Brandeis, J.).
151. See Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1953); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 71,070 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
152. General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 23 F.2d 822 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 588 (1928) ; Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1926); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 1955 Trade Cas.
71,070 (E.D. Pa. 1955); cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Walker Distrib.
Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Loeb v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). See generally TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, § 4.04 at 29
et seq.
153. TiMBMaaAE, supra note 17, at 29. In his treatise, Professor Timberlake points
out that:
It might be possible in a particular fact situation for a stockholder to prove in-
jury to himself. In Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th
Cir. 1953) the court followed the general rule that a stockholder cannot sue for
injury to the corporation. However, the stockholder also claimed direct injury
to him and the court recognized a right saying (p. 872) : "A wrong causing a
stockholder to part with his shares for less than their real value has been held to
be a direct injury to the individual stockholder. Coronado Development Cor-
poration v. Milliken, [175 Misc. 1, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674, 675] and cases there
cited." In the Peter case recovery was denied because prior to the sale of the
stock "its depreciation in value had already been suffered from injuries directly
affecting the corporation rather than the stockholder" (p. 872).
Id. In Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 71,070 (E.D. Pa. 1955), the plaintiff
shareholders also sought a dual recovery (as private shareholders and derivatively), but
their private action was dismissed as too remote and as improperly exalting the rights
of shareholders over the right of creditors. Cf. Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166
F. 820 (D. Mass. 1909).
154. TiMBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 29.
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tively, it does not extend to private shareholders who seek recovery for
damages incurred by them rather than by the corporation. Courts have
uniformly rejected the contentions of private stockholders that they have
the requisite standing.155 The rationale for such rejection is that any injury
to the shareholders is too incidental and remote to support a cause of
action.1"6 More importantly, stockholders' private suits are not permitted
because of the very nature of their claim. In a stockholder's private suit,
the plaintiff is essentially seeking recompense for diminution in the value
of his stock rather than recovery for the corporation. The target of the
illegal merger or acquisition, however, was the corporation, not the
stockholders.,"' By requiring a single corporate action rather than multiple
private stockholder actions, the rule is predicated upon sound policy. 5
For the same reasons, courts have consistently held that any injury
to officers, directors and employees is too peripheral to support a private,
independent action for damages suffered essentially by the corporation
Even if an officer or an employee has his employment relationship severed
as a result of the illegal merger or acquisition, his injury is, as a matter
of law, too remote to merit standing. Although most employment ter-
minations caused by antitrust violations are probably a result of con-
spiracies proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman Act, it is possible that in a
violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act a lessening of competition would
force residuary firms to pare their employment rosters in order to stay
alive economically. Regardless, the former employee would have no cause
of action because of the well settled rule that individual injuries sustained
by corporate employees through monopolistic practices are too remote
and incidental. 59
Like shareholders and employees, creditors of an injured corporation
are also denied standing. Standing is denied even if the infraction has
rendered the injured corporation unable to pay its outstanding debts to
the creditor. This rule has been extended to deny standing to any creditor
155. Id. at 29-30.
156. See, e.g., Darden v. Besser, 257 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1958); Walder v. Para-
mount Pub., 132 F. Supp. 913, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n, 36 F.2d 959
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) ; Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 F. 465, 466 (D. Mass. 1913). See gen-
erally, TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, at 29.
157. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. deied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
158. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910) ; Gerli v. Silk Ass'n,
36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See generally, TIMBELAKE, supra note 17, § 4.05, at 34-35.
159. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
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wishing to enforce the antitrust laws. 6 ' Even suppliers are included
within the scope of the rule. It has been well established that a supplier
is too remote and far removed from the target area to recover damages
resulting from a violation of the antitrust laws directed against the
supplier's customers.' 61
In spite of the broad and enthusiastic encouragement given for
private enforcement of the antitrust laws, the number of potential plain-
tiffs has been restricted because of the standing rules. Although the
injured corporation has standing, either on its own or through a deriva-
tive suit, "shareholders, creditors, directors, and officers of corporations
injured by monopolistic practices of competitors cannot recover their
individual losses"' 2 because they have no standing.
CONCLUSION,
A significant evolution in the area of private litigation predicatedt
on violations of § 7 of the Clayton Act has occurred within recent
years.0 8 Recent litigation, most notably the Gottesnan and Kirihara
cases, has recognized the private plaintiff's right to seek treble damages
based on illegal mergers or acquisitions. Attempts to procure equitable
remedies, such as injunction or divestiture, have been few; however, the
right to injunctive relief has been steadfastly upheld, and the right to
divestiture is heading in an affirmative direction.
If the Government has obtained a prior judgment of a § 7 violation,
the plaintiff's burden is eased significantly. But in view of the less restric-
tive standards necessary to prove a violation of the Clayton Act, vis-A-vis
the standards for Sherman Act violations, the burden of proving the § 7
violation is the least oppressive of the necessary elements. More burden-
some is proof of the fact of injury. Once the fact of injury is proved,
proof of the amount of damages has been subject to a less onerous
standard.
The issue of probabilities which is inherent in a private § 7 action,
continues to plague private litigants. While courts have granted equitable
relief pursuant to § 16, they have not yet awarded treble damages in a
160. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3rd Cir. 1910) ; Gerli v. Silk Ass'n,
36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See genwrally, TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, § 4.05, at 34-35.
161. See, e.g., Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F2d 383 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963). There is also a general rule that an as-
sociation is without standing "to enforce the separate property rights of its individual
members. . . ." Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Co., 28
F. Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Ala. 1939) ; Northern Cal. Monument Dealers Ass'n v. Inter-
ment Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
162. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
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particular case. Thus, the road for a private plaintiff seeking treble
damages is, indeed, little traveled and replete with chuckholes and other
obstacles. It has yet to be successfully traversed. But, the prize of treble
damages awaits the successful litigant, and it can be reasonably assumed
that that goal will soon be attained.
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